What it is
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to regulate certain international economic transactions after declaring a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act, when an unusual and extraordinary foreign threat endangers U.S. national security, foreign policy, or the economy. Typical tools include blocking transactions and freezing assets and other sanctions-style restrictions; the statute’s core use has been targeted financial and commercial sanctions, not tax-like duties. The law is implemented via presidential orders and regulations primarily administered by Treasury’s OFAC (and often coordinated with Commerce and State), but ultimate authority runs from the President’s emergency declaration. 

How it has been used
Historically, presidents have relied on the IEEPA to implement sanctions programs by blocking transactions and freezing property linked to countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia. 

In 2025, however, the IEEPA has been used in a broader way. The administration invoked IEEPA to justify new “reciprocal” tariffs and “fentanyl-related” import restrictions, citing the U.S. trade deficit and foreign supply-chain risks as national emergencies. 

These tariff-based actions represent a novel application of the statute beyond its traditional use for financial and commercial sanctions and have been the subject of ongoing legal challenges regarding the scope of presidential authority under the IEEPA. Federal courts have since ruled that such tariff-based uses of IEEPA likely exceed presidential authority, and the issue is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court has expedited review of the case, with oral arguments scheduled to start in mid-November 2025, following oral arguments earlier that month.

If the Supreme Court overturns the tariffs, importers would likely be entitled to refunds of duties paid under IEEPA, processed through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, while the decision would also restrict the current and future presidents from using emergency powers as a general tariff tool.

Importantly, such a ruling would not affect sanctions programs against countries like Iran, North Korea, or Russia, which are grounded in separate national emergency declarations and rely on IEEPA for targeted financial and commercial restrictions, not broad customs duties.

Implications for international exporters:
Because the IEEPA can be invoked rapidly and without a formal investigation, it introduces significant legal and commercial uncertainty for global trade. Foreign companies, including Swedish exporters that ship goods through or trade with affected countries, may face sudden restrictions, frozen payments, or new compliance obligations. Crucially, because IEEPA is fundamentally a sanctions tool, even its tariff-like measures require companies to maintain compliance systems that screen for both trade restrictions and financial sanctions risks.

Congressional developments:
In late October 2025, the U.S. Senate passed three joint resolutions to end the national emergencies that authorize the IEEPA tariffs on imports from Canada, Brazil, and globally. The House of Representatives has postponed any vote on these resolutions until early 2026, and the President could veto them if they were approved. For now, the tariffs remain in effect, but the Senate’s actions show growing bipartisan concern in Congress about using emergency powers for tariff policy. These votes do not affect the Supreme Court case directly, but if Congress were to end the emergency declarations, the tariffs would automatically expire and the case could become moot.